ading minds do not realize the intellectual
requirements of the higher realms of the naval art, or comprehend
what the examples of Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, Nelson, and Farragut
prove: that, _in the real crises of a nation's life her most valuable
asset is the trained skill in strategy that directs the movements
of her forces_.

Further than this, they may not realize that the greater the danger
which they must avert, the earlier they must begin to prepare for
it, because the more work in preparation will have to be performed;
and yet realization of this truth is absolutely vital, as is also
realization of the fact that we have no military power as our ally,
and therefore must be ready to meet alone a hostile attack (though
perhaps in the far-distant future) from _any_ foreign power. To
see that this is true it is merely necessary to note the facts of
history, and observe how nations that have long been on terms of
friendship have suddenly found themselves at war with each other;
and how countries which have always been hostile have found themselves
fighting side by side. In the present war, Great Britain is allied
with the two countries toward which, more than toward any other,
she has been hostile; and she is fighting the country to which,
more than any other, she is bound by ties of consanguinity and
common interests. The history of war is so filled with alternations
of peace and war between every pair of contiguous countries as to
suggest the thought that the mere fact of two countries having
interests that are common is a reason why their respective shares
in those interests may conflict; that countries which have no common
interests have nothing to fight about; that it is only for things
in which two nations are interested, and which both desire, that
those two nations fight.

If our estimate of the situation should lead us to the decision
that we must prepare our navy in such a way that, say twenty years
hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy,
we shall then instinctively adopt a policy. The fact of having
ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, will at once take us
out of the region of guesswork, and force us into logical methods.
We shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall see the
relation of one part to another, and of all the parts to the whole;
we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be
devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries ex