nally, the whole intricate
machine is put together, and the motive power applied. Then all
the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part
perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small;
all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to
law--fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. So,
the vast and new machine of the German navy was designed in the
drafting-room of the _Kriegspiel_; and though it has been gradually
strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and
each addition has been designed in accordance with the original
plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. Thus
the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. No
other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct,
the result was correct also.

Perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the German navy
has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by
_Kriegspiel_, that insures not only sound advice in general, but
also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent
officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action
should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. This factor
is most important; because in naval and military operations, even
in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other
so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the
demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is
imperative. The chess-player can linger long over his decisions,
because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in
warfare no such rule or condition can exist. In war, time is as
vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like Napoleon,
can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his
antagonist is, _ceteris paribus_, sure to win; and even if _ceteris_
are not quite _paribus_, his superior quickness and correctness
will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the
lives of all the great strategists in history, especially Alexander
and Napoleon, prove convincingly. To bring a preponderating force
to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy--to move the maximum
of force with the maximum of celerity--has always been the aim
of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of
strategy rests on principles, and principles never change.

Thus while we see in Great Britain's navy an example of the ef