lity is not required. In the same way, an
individual who is short-sighted and imperfectly educated may be
a most excellent and useful member of society, provided he is not
permitted to use power in matters beyond his vision. An illustration
of how an incorrect point of view does not necessarily injure, but
may even benefit in details is shown by certain militia regiments,
which are able to surpass some regiments of the regular army in
many details of the drill, and in general precision of movement.

In fact, a very wise strategical direction has as one of its most
important functions the division of study and labor among various
lines of action, and in deciding which lines are important and
which not: and for this reason may--and often does--limit labor,
and therefore perfection of result, along lines which a less wise
strategy would not limit. Illustrations of the casting aside of
rigid and difficult forms of drill during the past fifty years in
armies, and the substitution of more easy methods are numerous. This
does not indicate, however, that a wise strategy may not encourage
rigid forms of drill, for the army which is directed with the greatest
strategical skill is the German, and no army has more precise methods,
not only of procedure, but of drill. The Prussian army of Frederick
William which Frederick the Great inherited was not more rigidly
drilled in some particulars than the German army of to-day, fought
by Frederick the Great's great-great-great-grandnephew, William
II.

So we see that a wise and far-sighted strategy does not necessarily
either frown on or encourage attention to details; it merely regulates
it, deciding in each case and for each purpose what degree of attention
to detail is best.

The most obvious work of naval strategy, and therefore the work
that impresses people most, is in directing naval forces against
an enemy in war. But it is clear that before this can be done
effectively strategy must first have made plans of preparation
in time of peace; and it is equally clear that, previous to this,
strategy must first determine the units of the force and their
relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine.

Evidently, therefore, _the work of strategy is three-fold: first,
to design the machine; second, to prepare it for war; and, third,
to direct its operations during war_.

A navy being a machine composed of human and material parts, it is
clear that the work of des