f course, in the obvious element of personal
danger. It also differs from it in an equally important but less
obvious way--its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess
those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by
the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character
of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy
itself, assisted by engineering. Germany realizes this, and therefore
has established and followed a system whereby the character of
the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even
the number of them (under the restrictions of the money alloted),
are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy
and engineering.
There is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and
therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it
is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and
strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of
the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army,
to be employed by them to carry out the policy.
As naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in
their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country
and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for
the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries
to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force
or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be
good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute,
or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known.
Some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have
been made because of a lack of co-ordination between the government
and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work
together. We see an illustration of this throughout the history
of France, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked
harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been
opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence
has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon
it might lead one to expect.
Across the English Channel we see a totally different state of
things. In Great Britain the development of the navy has been going
on for more than twelve hundred years, ever since King Offa declared
that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." For
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