se conditions are represented
with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may
not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be
procured. The difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course
insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data
are very great. The more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more
clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more
effectively the remedies can be provided. The more the game-board
is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in
getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions
can then be deduced.

These remarks, while intended for tactical games, seem to apply to
strategical games as well; for both the tactical and the strategical
games are simply endeavors to represent actual or probable situations
and occurrences in miniature, by arbitrary symbols, in accordance
with well-understood conventions.

War games and war problems have not yet been accepted by some;
for some regard them as games pure and simple and as academic,
theoretical, and unpractical. It may be admitted that they are
academic and theoretical; but so is the science of gunnery, and so
is the science of navigation. In some ways, however, the lessons
of the game-board are better guides to future work than "practical"
and actual happenings of single battles: for in single battles
everything is possible, and some things happen that were highly
improbable and were really the result of accident. After nearly every
recent war there has been a strong move made toward the adoption
of some weapon, or some method, that has attained success in that
war. For instance, after our Civil War, many monitors were built,
and the spar torpedo was installed in all our ships; after the
battle of Lissa, the ram was exploited as the great weapon of the
future; the Japanese War established the heavily armed and armored
battleships on a secure foundation; and the early days of the present
war caused a great rush toward the submarine. Yet, in most cases,
the success was a single success or a very few successes, and was
a little like the throw of a die, in the sense that the result was
caused in great measure by accident; that is, by causes beyond
the control of man, or by conditions that would probably not recur.

The game calls our attention to the influence of chance in war,
and to the desirability of our recognizing that influen