here is no civilian between him and
it. In Germany there is no minister of marine, unless the Emperor
himself may be said to be the minister, which he practically is;
and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral.
The three parts are the General Staff, which deals with war plans
and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with
matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has
to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting
of money from Parliament. In Japan the minister of marine is by
law a naval officer, and under him is a chief of staff, also a
naval officer. The minister of marine has the direction of the
navy as a whole, but the ideas of the chief of staff are supposed
to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. The Japanese
naval officer has a higher regard for the office of chief of staff
than for that of minister of marine, because it is given for
professional excellence only.

It might seem at first sight that in Germany and Japan there would
be danger of a lack of co-ordination between the civil and the
naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly
self-assertive. Of course, one reason why there is no such danger
is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men
who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs,
and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy
is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general,
and interest in it so wide-spread and intense, that there is no
great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. Still another
reason is the fact that in each country the Emperor is trained in
military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore
can effect in his own person the co-ordination of the civil and
the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy.

Such automatic and complete co-ordination is desirable not only in
preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military
authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening
the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists.
If, for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large
sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists
will be led to recommendations different from those to which they
would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small
sum of money to be allotted.

Germany