that they must
get more ships and other material; but they realize this as only a
measure of urgency, and not as a matter of policy. If the emergency
passes us by in safety, the people may see in this fact only a
confirmation of their notion that war can be postponed _ad infinitum_,
and may therefore fail to take due precautions for the future. If
so, when we at last become involved in a sudden war, we shall be
as unprepared as now; and, relatively to some aggressive nation
which, foreseeing this, may purposely prepare itself, we shall
be more unprepared.
A curious phase of the navy question in our country is the fact
that very few people, even the most extreme partisans for or against
a large navy, have ever studied it as a problem and endeavored
to arrive at a correct solution. Few have realized that it is a
problem, in the strictest sense of the word; and that unless one
approaches it as such his conclusions cannot be correct except
by accident.
In Germany, on the other hand, and equally in Japan, the question
has been taken up as a concrete problem, just as definite as a
problem in engineering. They have used for solving it the method
called "The Estimate of the Situation," originated by the German
General Staff, which is now adopted in all the armies and navies of
civilized countries for the solution of military problems. Previous
to the adoption of this method the general procedure had been such
as is now common in civil life, when a number of people forming
a group desire to make a decision as to what they will do in any
given contingency. The usual procedure is for some one to suggest
that a certain thing be done, then for somebody else to suggest
that something else be done, and so on; and then finally for the
group to make a decision which is virtually a compromise. This
procedure is faulty, and the decisions resulting are apt to be
unwise; because it is quite possible that some very important factors
may be overlooked, and equally possible that some other factors
be given undue weight. Furthermore, a measure advocated by a man
who has the persuasive and emotional abilities of the orator is
more apt to be favorably considered than a measure advocated by
a man not possessing those abilities.
In the "Estimate of the Situation" method, on the other hand, the
orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate
process of reasoning. It is divided into four parts. The first
part consists
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