material of that navy, and a sound
conception of strategy itself. But to decide the questions correctly
is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future
plans.

Naturally, as the plan is entirely supposititious and is to take
effect at some indefinite time in the future, all the factors that
will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and
therefore must be estimated. This will necessitate several alternate
hypotheses; and a war plan including mobilization and operations
must be made out, based on each hypothesis. For instance, on the
hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans
will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the
offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at
that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while
on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set
of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization
and operations must be devised.

Each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided
into two or more parts. On the basis that the enemy will remain
on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour
for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared,
may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it
can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the
fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for
us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially
if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the
advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay
before starting.

But no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every
probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated
in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly when
the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans
into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans
are executed first will take a long step toward victory.

Not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves
shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans
must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate
must be performed. Not only must the plans provide that all the
prearranged orders for putting the _Kearsarge_ into full commission
shall be instantly sent by mail, telegr