mplex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne
such names as Alexander, Caesar, Nelson, and Napoleon. Naval strategy
is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place
of queens and other pieces. But it is a more complicated game than
chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces,"
but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while
it does not even exist in chess. The time element has the effect not
only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense
concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often
it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under
circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort, and personal
peril.

One dislikes intensely to criticise his own country, even to himself.
But when a naval officer is studying--as he should continually do--what
must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some
foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the
situation otherwise than honestly; and to do this, it is necessary
to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively
to the possible foes in question. If we do this, and compare the
strategical methods employed by--say Germany and us--we are forced
to admit that the German methods are better adapted to producing
economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against
an enemy. In Germany the development of the navy has been strictly
along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand; in our
country no method whatever is apparent, at least no logical method.
Congress, and Congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft
shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform.
It is true that they consult the report of the secretary of the
navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers; and it is true
that the secretary of the navy gets the opinions of certain naval
officers including the General Board, before making his report.
But both the secretary and Congress estimate the situation from
their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice
of naval officers. And the advice of these naval officers is not
so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is
really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it
will not be taken very seriously. The difference between the advice
of men held responsible for the results of foll