the more
perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness
consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35)
"whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the
dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the
Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some
other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to
rule the body."
Reply Obj. 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of
the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of
the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the
body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect
of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that
natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.
Reply Obj. 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as
that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any
individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,
when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the
animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual
being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the
whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite
after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the
form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the
composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 75, A. 2). It follows, therefore, that after being
separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it
can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect
specific nature.
Reply Obj. 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect:
and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.
Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be
white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.
Reply Obj. 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by
way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a
hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of
some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not
all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a
hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but
prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is
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