ce they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear
that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power
in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the
will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for
an end.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet
it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way
that it is a cause.

Reply Obj. 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be
voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action
is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by
the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited
by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is
impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end.
For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is
color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of
seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object;
so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of
willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last
end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some
action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore
whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even
when he does that action in which the last end consists.

Reply Obj. 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since
they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the
proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an
imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Act for an End?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature
to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,
never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many
things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are
altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because
they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational
animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for
an end.

Obj. 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an
end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to
things that lack reason.

Obj. 3: