nd it, as is the case of those things which are altogether
void of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the
end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when
he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's
compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it
is thus with irrational creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs
itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that
which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an
irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in
universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that
lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal;
but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate
to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are
moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends
the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular
departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason
are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational
will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]

Whether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End?

Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their
end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified
by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by
their end.

Obj. 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a
human act does not derive its species from the end.

Obj. 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But
one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.
Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):
"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds
worthy of blame or praise."

_I answer that,_ Each thing receives its species in respect of an act
and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of
matter and form are established in their respective species by their
own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper move