marks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are
evident.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 3]

Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Sensitive Part, or of the
Intellective Part Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of
the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than
that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the
intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot
understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness
consists in an operation of the senses also.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some
goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.
Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for
happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in
_Ethic._ i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby
in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by
sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for
happiness.

_On the contrary,_ Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in
common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.
Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.

_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)
essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of
sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness
consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which
is his last end, as shown above (A. 1): to Which man cannot be united
by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as
shown above (Q. 2, A. 5), man's happiness does not consist in goods
of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the
operation of the senses.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness,
both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the
operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense;
consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven;
because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul,"
as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses
will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in t