ollow that delight
is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results
from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the
essential and supreme good.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]
Whether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man's Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes
man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But
happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the
body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods
of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than
the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we
desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man
desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more
than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which
is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and
desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:
not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is
perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to
the body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging
to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own
sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is
in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in
no good of the soul.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold:
namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use,
namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak
of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul
itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in
itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes
knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually
virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is
for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in
potentiality cannot be the last e
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