of the
intellect, which is vision.
Obj. 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or
enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks
before vision.
_On the contrary,_ The cause is greater than its effect. But vision
is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.
_I answer that,_ The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x,
4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,
the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank
before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will.
Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of
the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will
reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness
of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose;
for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been
disproved above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2;Q. 3, A. 4): but it seeks to be at
rest in the operation, because that operation is its good.
Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will
reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.
Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects
operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth.
Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a
perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.
Reply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the
universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And
consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in
animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the
intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which
results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather
than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the
Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the
operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply
according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather
according to the order of the intellectual appetite.
Reply Obj. 3: Charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of
delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good
gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its
end, but v
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