ments. For
since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each
of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act
which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is
the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is
nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while
heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat:
and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either
way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as
passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be
considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by
himself. Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that acts are called
human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the
object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear
that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the
end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act
terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural
agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of
the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.)
"morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking
receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as
human acts.

Reply Obj. 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because
it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just
this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,
considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as
passion.

Reply Obj. 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention,
pertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). And it is thus
that it gives the species to the human or moral act.

Reply Obj. 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds
once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which
it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of
which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an
act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to
several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but
one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an
end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger:
the result being that there would be several acts in different species
of morality: since