ults from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power
of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to
the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For
since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that
part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a
certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul
which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a
way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a
fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is
independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which
is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate
through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of
matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and
contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident
that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily
delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good,
but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it
is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a
little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness
itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire
delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus
it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne
downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is
desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for
anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But
if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is
desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object
of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its
form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in
the thing desired.
Reply Obj. 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises
from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the
principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that
sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.
Reply Obj. 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good:
and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,
as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not f
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