ppiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general;
(2) happiness.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?

(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?

(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?

(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?

(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?

(7) Whether all men have the same last end?

(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]

Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for
an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,
implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But
that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this
preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it
does not belong to man to act for an end.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end.
But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

Obj. 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts
deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,
sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when
one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent
on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

_On the contrary,_ All things contained in a genus are derived from
the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human
operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it
belongs to man to do everything for an end.

_I answer that,_ Of actions done by man those alone are properly
called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from
irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.
Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man
is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and
will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will
of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which
proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in
man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human"
actions, sin