in one way there will be an act of virtue, in
another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species
from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which
is its _per se_ terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural
thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to
morality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same
considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered
in their moral species, and conversely.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]
Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life,
but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds
from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other
good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has
the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.
Obj. 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to
infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same
reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,
the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is
consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that
there is also an infinite series of ends.
Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But
the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can
will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely.
Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and
there is no last end of the human will.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to
suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the
good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary
to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is
necessary to fix one last end.
_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed
indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in
whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if
the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of
necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,
because then there w
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