ision does, whereby the end is first made present to
charity.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]
Whether Comprehension Is Necessary for Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for
happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf.
Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is
happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is
without comprehension.
Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his
intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the
intellect and will, as stated in the First Part (QQ. 79 and
following). But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing
God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for
comprehension as a third.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations
are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects,
the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and
good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a
third.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you
may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the
spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7, 8): "I have fought a good
fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the
rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore
comprehension is necessary for Happiness.
_I answer that,_ Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end,
those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from
the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an
intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his
will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect
knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will,
first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything;
secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which
relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present
to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is
not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is
not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is
raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have
it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that
which he hopes for, and this relation alone
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