ss; but because it is antecedent and
consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are
removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end:
consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains
at peace, his desire being at rest.

Reply Obj. 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither
is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.
Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as
the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as
its act.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does:
yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the
will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the
end, viz. delight or enjoyment.

Reply Obj. 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge
precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an
intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain
a sensible end by an act of sense.

Reply Obj. 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he
has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the
act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness,
as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among
the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an
inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus
of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality."
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 5]

Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Speculative, or of the
Practical Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in
becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect,
which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his
speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things.
Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical
intellect rather than of the speculative.

Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical
intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be
good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but
not in reference to the perfection