n ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a
bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Reply Obj. 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power:
therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
good consists in power.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Any Bodily Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily
goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above
the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that
which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better
than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But
for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary.
Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that
health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the
principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the
greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the
efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the
causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore,
just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the
last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself
is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness
consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the
health of the body.
_On the contrary,_ Man surpasses all other animals in regard to
happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for
instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by
the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in
goods of the body.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in
the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a
thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot
consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not
intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him,
since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to
navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he
may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason;
according
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