ponsibility
for equal treatment and opportunity of black servicemen extended
beyond the gates of the military reservation. Deeply ingrained in the
officer corps was the conviction that the role of the military was to
serve, not to change, society. To effect social change, the
traditionalist argued, would require an intrusion into politics that
was by definition militarism. It was the duty of the Department of
Justice and other civilian agencies, not the armed forces, to secure
those social changes essential for the protection of the rights of
servicemen in the civilian community.[24-1] If these arguments appear
to have overlooked the real causes of the services' wartime racial
problems and ignored some of the logical implications of Truman's
equal treatment and opportunity order, they were nevertheless in the
mainstream of American military thought, ardently supported, and
widely proclaimed.

[Footnote 24-1: Speaking at a later date on this
subject, former Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton
Collins observed that "when we look about us and
see the deleterious effects of military
interference in civilian governments throughout ...
many other areas of the world, we can be grateful
that American military leaders have generally stuck
to their proper sphere." See Memo, Collins for OSD
Historian, 21 Aug 76, copy in CMH.]

The story of integration in the armed forces has usually, and with
some logic, been told in terms of the conflict between the "good"
civil rights advocates and the "bad" traditionalists. In fact, the
history of integration goes beyond the dimensions of a morality play
and includes a number of other influences both institutional and
individual.

[Illustration: VIETNAM PATROL. _Men of the 35th Infantry advance
during "Operation Baker."_]

The most prominent of these institutional factors were federal
legislation and executive orders. After World War II most Americans
moved slowly toward acceptance of the proposition that equal treatment
and opportunity for the nation's minorities was both just and
prudent.[24-2] A drawn-out process, this acceptance was in reality a
grudging concession to the promptings of the civil rights movement;
translated into federal legislation, it exerted constant pressure (p. 612)
on the racial policy of the armed fo