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decision in 1963 to push for equal opportunity for black servicemen outside the gates of the military base.[24-5] [Footnote 24-5: Portions of the following discussion have been published in somewhat different form under the title "Armed Forces Integration--Forced or Free?" in _The Military and Society, Proceedings of the Fifth Military Symposium_ (U.S. Air Force Academy, 1972).] The Navy was the acknowledged pioneer in integration. Its decision during World War II to assign black and white sailors to certain ships was not entirely a response to pressures from civil rights advocates, although Secretary James Forrestal relied on his friends in the Urban League, particularly Lester Granger, to teach him the techniques of integrating a large organization. Nor was the decision solely the work of racial reformers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, although this small group was undoubtedly responsible for drafting the regulations that governed the changes in the wartime Navy. Rather, the Navy began integrating its general service because segregation proved painfully inefficient. The decision was largely the result of the impersonal operation of the 1940 draft law. Although imperfectly applied during the war, the anti-discrimination provision of that law produced a massive infusion of black inductees. The Army, with its larger (p. 615) manpower base and expandable black units, could evade the implications of a nondiscrimination clause, but the sheer presence of large numbers of Negroes in the service, more than any other force, breached the walls of segregation in the Navy. [Illustration: LOADING A ROCKET LAUNCHER. _Crewmen of the USS Carronade participating in a coordinated gunfire support action near Chu Lai, Vietnam._] The Navy experiment with an all-black crew had proved unsatisfactory, and only so many shore-based jobs were considered suitable for large segregated units. Bowing to the argument that two navies--one black, one white--were both inefficient and expensive, Secretary Forrestal began to experiment with integration during the last months of the war and finally announced a policy of integration in February 1946. The full application of this new policy would wait for some years while the Navy's traditional racial attitudes warred with its practical desire for efficiency. The Air Force was
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