n Congress by
a civil rights bloc--for bloc it had now become in the wake of the
election that sent Harry Truman back to the White House. No longer the
concern of a congressman or two, the cause of the black serviceman was
now supported by a group of politicians who, joining with civil rights
leaders, pressed the Department of Defense for rapid changes in its
racial practices.

The traditionalists in the armed forces also had congressional allies.
In all probability these legislators would accept an integrated Navy
because it involved relatively few Negroes; they might even tolerate
an integrated Air Force because they lacked a proprietary attitude
toward this new service; but they would fight to keep the Army
segregated because they considered the Army their own.[15-2]
Congressional segregationists openly opposed changes in the Army's
racial policy only when they thought the time was right. They carefully
avoided the subject in the months following publication of the (p. 380)
executive order, waiting to bargain until their support became crucial
to the success of such vital military legislation as the renewal of
the Selective Service Act and the establishment of universal military
training.

[Footnote 15-2: Interv, Nichols with Gen Wade H.
Haislip, 1953, in Nichols Collection; Telephone
Interv, author with Haislip, 18 Mar 71; Interv,
author with Martin Blumenson, 8 Jan 68. All in CMH
files.]

At most, Congress played only a minor role in the dramatic changes
beginning in the armed forces. Champions of civil rights had little
effect on service practices, although these congressmen channeled the
complaints of black voters and kept the military traditionalists on
the defensive. As for the congressional traditionalists, their support
may have helped sustain those on the staff who resisted racial change
within the Army, thus slowing down that service's integration. But the
demands of congressional progressives and obstructionists tended to
cancel each other out, and in the wake of the Fahy Committee's
disbandment the services themselves reemerged as the preeminent factor
in the armed forces racial program.

The services regained control by default. Logically, direction of
racial reforms in the services should have fallen to the Secretary of
Defense. In the first place, the secretary, other administration
officials, and t