esident's Cmte on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in
the Armed Forces, "A First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file.

The process of screening Lockbourne's troops was quickly completed,
but the process of reassigning them was considerably more drawn-out.
The reassignments were somewhat delayed in the first place by
indecision, caused by budgetary uncertainties, on the future of
Lockbourne itself. By 25 July, a full two months after the screening
began, the Lockbourne board had recommended only 181 officers and 700
airmen to Air Force headquarters for new assignment. A short time
later, however, Lockbourne was placed on inactive status and its
remaining men and women, with the exception of a small caretaker
detachment, were quickly reassigned throughout the Air Force.

The staff had predicted that the speed with which the integration
order was carried out would follow a geographical pattern, with
southern bases the last to integrate, but in fact no special pattern
prevailed. For the many Negroes assigned to all-black base squadrons
for administrative purposes but serving on a day-to-day basis in
integrated units, the change was relatively simple. These men had
already demonstrated their ability to perform their duties competently
under integration, and in conformity with the new order most (p. 404)
commanders immediately assigned them to the units in which they were
already working. Except for their own squadron overhead, some base
service squadrons literally disappeared when these reassignments were
effected. After the screening process, most commanders also quickly
reassigned troops serving in the other all-black units, such as
Squadron F's, air ammunition, motor transport, vehicle repair, signal
heavy construction, and aviation engineer squadrons.[16-26]

[Footnote 16-26: "Report on the First Year of
Implementation of Current Policies Regarding Negro
Personnel," Incl to Memo, Maj Gen Richard E. Nugent
for ASecAF, 14 Jul 50, sub: Distribution of Negro
Personnel, PPB 291.2 (9 Jul 50) (hereafter referred
to as Marr Report). See also USAF Oral Hist Interv
with Marr.]

There were of course a few exceptions. Some commanders, noticeably
more cautious than the majority, began the integration process with
considerably less ease and speed.[