designations because the Army's quota system, still in
effect, depended on this information. Less clear, however, was why the
board failed to consider the problem of who should make the racial
determination. At any rate, its new list of racial categories,
approved by the secretary and published on 11 October, immediately
drew complaints from members of the department.[15-5]

[Footnote 15-5: Memo, Dep Dir, Personnel Policy Bd
Staff, for Chmn, PPB, 13 Sep 49, sub: Project
Summary--Change of Nomenclature on Enlistment Forms
as Pertains to "Race" Entries (M-63); Memo, Chmn,
PPB, for SA et al., 11 Oct 49, sub: Policy
Regarding Race Entries on Enlistment Contracts and
Shipping Articles; both in PPB 291.2.]

[Illustration: NAVY CORPSMAN IN KOREA _attends wounded from the 1st
Marine Division, 1950_.]

The secretary's racial adviser, James C. Evans, saw no need for (p. 382)
racial designations on departmental forms, but knowing their removal
was unlikely in the near future, he concentrated on trying to change
the newly revised categories. He explained to the board, obviously
unschooled in the nuance of racial slurs, that the word "Negroid" was
offensive to many Negroes. Besides, the board's categories made no
sense since Indian (American) and Malayan were not comparable to the
other three entries listed. Why not, he suggested, settle for the old
black, white, yellow, red, and brown designations?[15-6]

[Footnote 15-6: Memo, Evans for Chmn, PPB, 25 Nov 49,
sub: Racial Designation and Terminology, SD 291.2;
Interv, author with Evans, 22 Jul 71, CMH files.]

The Navy, too, objected to the board's categories. After consulting a
Smithsonian ethnologist, the Under Secretary of the Navy suggested
that the board create a sixth category, Polynesian, for use in
shipping articles and in forms for reporting casualties. The Army,
also troubled by the categories, requested they be defined. The
categories were meant to provide a uniform basis for classifying
military personnel, The Adjutant General pointed out, but given the
variety and complexity of Army forms--he had discovered that the Army
was using seven separate forms with racial entries, each with a
different procedure for deciding race--uniformity was practically (p. 383)
impossible withou