protect servicemen off military bases was more than a decade away.

[Footnote 15-62: Ltr, Mitchell to Rosenberg, 16 Apr
51; Ltr, Rosenberg to Mitchell, 9 May 51; both in
SD 291.2.]

[Footnote 15-63: Memo, ASD (MP&R) for ASD (Legal and
Legis Affairs), 14 Jun 51, SD 291.1; PL 51, 82d
Congress.]

[Footnote 15-64: Ltr, Mitchell, Dir, Washington Br,
NAACP, to Dir of Industrial Relations, DOD, 25 May
51; Ltr, ASD (Legal and Legis Affairs) to Mitchell,
19 Jun 51; Memo, Asst Gen Counsel, OSD, for ASD
(Legal and Legis Affairs), 19 Jun 51. All in SD
291.2.]

Despite her concern over possible congressional opposition, Rosenberg
achieved one important reform during her first year in office. For
years the Army's demand for a parity of enlistment standards had been
opposed by the Navy and the Air Force and had once been rejected by
Secretary Forrestal. Now Rosenberg was able to convince Marshall and
the armed services committees that in times of manpower shortages the
services suffered a serious imbalance when each failed to get its fair
share of recruits from the various so-called mental categories.[15-65]
Her assistant, Ralph P. Sollat, prepared a program for her
incorporating Roy K. Davenport's specific suggestions. The program
would allow volunteer enlistments to continue but would require all
the services to give a uniform entrance test to both volunteers and
draftees. (Actually, rather than develop a completely new entrance
test, the other services eventually adopted the Army's, which was
renamed the Armed Forces Qualification Test.) Sollat also devised an
arrangement whereby each service had to recruit men in each of the
four mental categories in accordance with an established quota.
Manpower experts agreed that this program offered the best chance to
distribute manpower equally among the services. Approved by Secretary
Marshall on 10 April 1951 under the title Qualitative Distribution of
Military Manpower Program, it quickly changed the intellectual
composition of the services by obliging the Navy and Air Force to
share responsibility with the Army for the training and employment (p. 395)
of less gifted inductees. For the remainder of the Korean War, for
example, each of the services, not just th