8]
The President's agreement with Secretary Gray about reimposing a quota
notwithstanding, it was highly unlikely that the Army could have done
so without returning to the White House for permission, and when in
May 1951 the Army staff renewed its demand, Pace considered asking the
White House for a quota on Negroes in category IV. After consulting
with Rosenberg on the long-term effects of qualitative distribution of
manpower, however, Pace agreed to drop the matter.[15-69]

[Footnote 15-68: G-1 Summary Sheet with incl, 13 Mar
51, sub: Negro Strength in the Army; Memo, ASA for
CofS, 13 Apr 51, same sub; both in CS 291.2 Negroes
(13 Mar 51).]

[Footnote 15-69: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 31 May 51,
sub: Present Overstrength in Segregated Units; G-1
Summary Sheet for CofS, 26 May 51, same sub; Draft
Memo, Frank Pace, Jr., for President; Memo, ASA for
SA, 1 Jul 51. All in G-1 291.2 (26 May 51).]

Executive Order 9981 passed its third anniversary in July 1951 (p. 396)
with little having happened in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to lift the hearts of the champions of integration. The race issues
with which the Secretary of Defense concerned himself in these
years--the definition of race, the status of black servicemen
overseas, even the parity of enlistment standards--while no doubt
important in the long run to the status of the Negro in the armed
forces, had little to do with the immediate problem of segregation.
Secretary Johnson had done nothing to enforce the executive order in
the Army and his successor achieved little more. Willing to let the
services set the pace of reform, neither secretary substantially
changed the armed forces' racial practices. The integration process
that began in those years was initiated, appropriately enough perhaps,
by the services themselves.

CHAPTER 16 (p. 397)

Integration in the Air Force and the Navy

The racial reforms instituted by the four services between 1949 and
1954 demonstrated that integration was to a great extent concerned
with effective utilization of military manpower. In the case of the
Army and the Marine Corps the reforms would be delayed and would
occur, finally, on the field of battle. The Navy and the Air Force,
however,