it, would truly integrate the service. They
could, for example, see no way for the Air Force to break through what
the press called the "community patterns" around southern bases, and
they were generally suspicious of the motives of senior department
officials. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ summarized this attitude by
quoting one black officer who expressed doubt "that a fair program
will be enforced from the top echelon."[16-10]

[Footnote 16-9: Washington _Post_, April 4, 1949; USAF
Oral History Program, Interview with Lt Col Spann
Watson (USAF, Ret.), 3 Apr 73.]

[Footnote 16-10: Pittsburgh _Courier_, January 22,
1949.]

But such suspicions were unfounded, for the Air Force's senior
officials were determined to enforce the new program both fairly and
expeditiously. General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff, reported to the
War Council on 11 January that the Air Force would "effect full and
complete implementation" of its integration plan not only by issuing
the required directives and orders, but also by assigning
responsibility for monitoring the worldwide implementation of the
program to his deputy for personnel. The Chief of Staff also planned
to call a meeting of his senior commanders to discuss and solve
problems rising from the plan and impress on them the personal
attention they must give to carrying it out in the field.[16-11]

[Footnote 16-11: Memo, Vandenberg, CofS, USAF, for
SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]

The Air Force Commanders' Conference, assembled on 12 April 1949,
heard Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
explain the genesis of the integration plan and outline its major
provisions. He mentioned two major steps to be taken in the first
phase of the program. First, the 332d Fighter Wing would be
inactivated on or before 30 June, and all blacks would be removed from
Lockbourne. The commander of the Continental Air Command would create
a board of Lockbourne officers to screen those assigned to the
all-black base, dividing them into three groups. The skilled and
qualified officers and airmen would be reassigned worldwide to white
units "just like any other officers or airmen of similar skills (p. 400)
and qualifications." General Edwards assumed that the number of men in
this category would not be large. Some 200 officers and 1,500 airmen,
he