the Admiral
would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief."
He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, and
hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. In
short, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such critical
circumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chance
offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point Judith,
and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learned
the events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was well
provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part of
the Island.
As deGrasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach of
a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals of
Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essential
to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay,
was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferior
squadron.[31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by the
mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages depended
upon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in support
of the most extreme view of the effect of a "fleet in being;" but
the instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggest
the question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the
existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon
the characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary British
narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the
various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron,
says: "The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that
the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his
Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion: under
such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the
General any essential relief." In both these instances, the admirals
concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not
of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organised
forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect
produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither
case would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landed
the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships. The next
morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind
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