solated and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and the
squadron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either
would be decisive.

By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line from
La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Morne
Fortune (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island. The feeble French
garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked, and its
ammunition and stores untouched,--another instance of the danger of
works turning to one's own disadvantage. It was Barrington's purpose
now to remove the transports to the Carenage, as a more commodious
harbour, probably also better defended; but he was prevented by
the arrival of d'Estaing that afternoon. "Just as all the important
stations were secured, the French colours struck, and General Grant's
headquarters established at the Governor's house, the _Ariadne_
frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for the approach of an
enemy."[55] The French fleet was seen soon afterwards from the heights
above the squadron.

The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still spared
no time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers in
strengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Admiral in rectifying
his order to meet the expected attack. The transports, between fifty
and sixty in number, were moved inside the ships of war, and the
latter were most carefully disposed across the mouth of the Cul de
Sac bay. At the northern (windward)[56] end was placed the _Isis_, 50,
well under the point to prevent anything from passing round her; but
for further security she was supported by three frigates, anchored
abreast of the interval between her and the shore. From the _Isis_
the line extended to the southward, inclining slightly outward; the
_Prince of Wales_, 74, Barrington's flagship, taking the southern
flank, as the most exposed position. Between her and the _Isis_ were
five other ships,--the _Boyne_, 70, _Nonsuch_, 64, _St. Albans_, 64,
_Preston_, 50, and _Centurion_, 50. The works left by the French at
the north and south points of the bay may have been used to support
the flanks, but Barrington does not say so in his report.

D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and two days after this was
able to land seven thousand troops. With such a superiority it is
evident that the British would have been stopped in the midst of their
operations, if he had arrived twenty-four hours sooner