would
be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed purpose of avoiding action
except under favourable circumstances. As the smoke thickened and
confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever
the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.
Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the
French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it is
certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was
greater than that of the British.

Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour,
or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppel
had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his will;
d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiority
of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal been
promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the British fleet, in
fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concentrated his fire
on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the delay, it was
distinctly in his power to renew the fight; and that he did not do so
forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of the better condition
of the French ships, Keppel, by running off the wind, had given his
opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet and to attack. Instead
of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the British lee, out of range,
and offered battle; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.

Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have permitted.
He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated; to windward,
or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the conditions, it
was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and to await his
pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted this chance, should
have renewed the fight; and here arose the controversy which set
all England by the ears, and may be said to have immortalised this
otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was to windward from
4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form line of battle, and
to bear down in the Admiral's wake; and Keppel alleged that, had these
been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have renewed the battle, having still
over two hours of daylight. It has been stated already that, besides
the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was
waiting only for him.

The immediate