These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a
change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, before
Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but
the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.
The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,--a
resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels
aiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin shore operations,
too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country
to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, but
could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterly
gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies
out of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that the
British fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, which
decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the
shipping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to
reenter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.
This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return
up Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but decline
action, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d of
September he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards received
orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anchored
there.

The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer campaign by
the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not ready
according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised
in the probable cooperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and
Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great
Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been
foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it was
essential to prevent a junction,--to take an interior position. The
Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.
After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention
of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked,
off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, they
were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however,
for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular
outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports.