ts, set many of Rodney's ships and
convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was not till the
26th that the flagship herself anchored. The storeships for Minorca
were sent on at once, under charge of three coppered ships of the
line. The practice of coppering, though then fully adopted, had not
yet been extended to all vessels. As an element of speed, it was an
important factor on an occasion like this, when time pressed to get
to the West Indies; as it also was in an engagement. The action on the
16th had been opened by the coppered ships of the line, which first
overtook the retreating enemy and brought his rear to battle. In
the French navy at the time, Suffren was urging the adoption upon an
apparently reluctant Minister. It would seem to have been more general
among the British, going far to compensate for the otherwise inferior
qualities of their ships. "The Spanish men-of-war we have taken,"
wrote Rodney to his wife concerning these prizes, "are much superior
to ours." It may be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said
the same of the Spanish vessels which came under his observation. "I
never saw finer ships." "I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered
ships," wrote the First Lord to Rodney after this action; "and I
am therefore determined to stop your mouth. You shall have copper
enough."

Upon the return of the Minorca ships, Rodney put to sea again on the
13th of February, for the West Indies. The detachment from the Channel
fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his way, and then parted
for England with the prizes. On this return voyage it fell in with
fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two 64's, bound for the
Ile de France,[74] in the Indian Ocean. One of the ships of war, the
_Protee_, and three of the storeships were taken. Though trivial, the
incident illustrates the effect of operations in Europe upon war in
India. It may be mentioned here as indicative of the government's
dilemmas, that Rodney was censured for having left one ship of the
line at the Rock. "It has given us the trouble _and risk_ of sending
a frigate on purpose to order her home immediately; and if you will
look into your original instructions, you will find that there was
no point more strongly guarded against than that of your leaving
any line-of-battle ship behind you." These words clearly show the
exigency and peril of the general situation, owing to the inadequate
development of the naval force as comp