afford, as things stood. Just after he
had fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to the
southward two points,[43] from south-west to south-south-west, which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the line
they were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continued
on the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard,
and at 10.15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships to
tack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the same
tack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. This
put the British in column,[44] still to leeward, but nearly astern of
the enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall came
up, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of an
hour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouring
the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them to
lay up for the enemy's rear after which (French BB) they were standing
and could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, the
French were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together,
and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).
Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and
from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter
could not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van
of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be
misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of
them as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage,
and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his ships
to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly,
but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.

[Illustration]

Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he
now. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy was avoiding
action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some
risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides,
thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these,
forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing,
we