selves with firing upon
these ships when passing barely within gunshot, and suffered them to
rejoin the squadron, without one effort to cut them off." Suffren,[65]
who led the French on the starboard tack, and whose ship, the
_Fantasque_, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote: "Had our
admiral's seamanship equalled his courage, we would not have allowed
four dismasted ships to escape." That the _Monmouth_ and _Fame_ could
also have been secured is extremely probable; and if Byron, in order
to save them, had borne down to renew the action, the disaster might
have become a catastrophe.

That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage
is therefore to be ascribed to the incapacity of their
Commander-in-Chief. It is instructive to note also the causes of the
grave calamity which befell the British, when twenty-one ships met
twenty-four,[66]--a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These
facts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due to
attacking with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder.
He had the weather-gage, it was early morning, and the northeast
trade-wind, already a working breeze, must freshen as the day
advanced. The French were tied to their new conquest, which they could
not abandon without humiliation; not to speak of their troops ashore.
Even had they wished to retreat, they could not have done so before
a general chase, unless prepared to sacrifice their slower ships.
If twenty-four ships could reconcile themselves to running from
twenty-one, it was scarcely possible but that the fastest of these
would overtake the slowest of those. There was time for fighting, an
opportunity for forcing action which could not be evaded, and time
also for the British to form in reasonably good order.

It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must be
approved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed for
attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch opportunity from
an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pick
and choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he brought his fleet into action,
giving mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line.
What Byron did has been set forth; the sting is that his bungling
tactics can find no extenuation in any urgency of the case.

The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either
nation, were: British, 183 killed, 346 wounded; French, 190 killed,
759 wounded. Of the B