tle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station
(Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy,
(F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight,--a
preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once
and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the
_Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in
behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair
damage and take their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the
line. Palliser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves
before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they
testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and
not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus,
on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, a
separate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of
the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig.
3, R). At 5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten
into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, as
they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British,
their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same time Harland was
directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at
once did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with
extraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoning
the rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at last
did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then
grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter
and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it
was thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight the
next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks;
but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the
mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.

Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the
British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161
killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicate
that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to
cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the motive-power. This