t. Vincent, which
was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On the 30th the French
admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet,--twenty-five
ships of the line and several frigates,--directing his course for the
British Island of Grenada, before which he anchored on the 2d of July.
With commendable promptitude, he landed his troops that evening, and
on the 4th the island capitulated. Except as represented by one small
armed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in this
transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships were captured in the
port.

At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of the
line, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying
troops and equipments. He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st,
and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that the
French had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put to sea on the
3d, with the force mentioned.

[Illustration]

The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night of
July 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown,
at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been under
way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.[57] At 4 A.M. the French
began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle on
the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possible
without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully made, the
British fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, close
inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east.
It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships
nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been
in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident
excuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly
that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency,
or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when the
imminent probability of a meeting exists. The worst results of the day
are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of frigates, Byron had
assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, to
the convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, and
somewhat in the rear. It was understood, however, that these would be
called into the line, if needed.

When the French (AA) wer