. To gain time,
Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Royal,
less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of his
squadron, to cover the approaches to Santa Lucia; but, despite his
care, d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, as
has been said, was off Santa Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the
15th he stood in for the Carenage; but when he came within range, a
lively cannonade told him that the enemy was already in possession.
He decided therefore to attack the squadron in the Cul de Sac, and
at 11.30 the French passed along it from north to south, firing, but
without effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directed
upon the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British had
three men killed; the French loss is not given, but is said to
have been slight. It is stated that that day the sea breeze did not
penetrate far enough into the bay to admit closing. This frequently
happens, but it does not alter the fact that the squadron was the
proper point of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, an
opportunity to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably by
the soldierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assault
the works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Carenage,
he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm the
British lines at La Vigie. The neck of land connecting the promontory
with the island is very flat, and the French therefore labored under
great disadvantage through the commanding position of their enemy.
It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other ill-judged
and precipitate frontal attacks. After three gallant but ineffectual
charges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with the
loss of forty-one officers and eight hundred rank and file, killed and
wounded.
[Illustration]
D'Estaing reembarked his men, and stood ready again to attack
Barrington; a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to give
notice when the wind should serve. On the 24th she signalled, and the
fleet weighed; but Barrington, who had taken a very great risk for an
adequate object, took no unnecessary chances through presumption. He
had employed his respite to warp the ships of war farther in, where
the breeze reached less certainly, and where narrower waters gave
better support to the flanks. He had strengthened the latter also by
new works, in which he had placed hea
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