with a
brief intermission, until December, 1783.

It is perhaps necessary to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandoned
the field.[53] The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to
warrant further discussion of an episode the historical interest of
which is very slight, though its professional lessons are valuable.
The British case had the advantage--through the courts-martial--of
the sworn testimony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the
British kept on the same tack under short sail throughout the night,
and that in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far
as known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.

[Footnote 38: _Ante_, pp. 61, 62.]

[Footnote 39: Testimony of Captains Hood, Robinson, and Macbride, and
of Rear-Admiral Campbell, captain of the fleet to Keppel.]

[Footnote 40: See note on preceding page.]

[Footnote 41: A vessel is said to be on the port tack when she has the
wind blowing on her port, or left side; on the starboard tack, when
the wind is on the right side. Thus with an east wind, if she head
north, she is on the starboard tack; if south, on the port.]

[Footnote 42: See also note; _post_, p. 200.]

[Footnote 43: Twenty-two degrees.]

[Footnote 44: Column and line ahead are equivalent terms, each ship
steering in the wake of its next ahead.]

[Footnote 45: Forty-five degrees.]

[Footnote 46: Chevalier says, p. 89, "The English passed out of range"
of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice of
range, barring signals from their own admiral. In truth, they were
obeying his order.]

[Footnote 47: This evidence of the captains of the _Ocean_ and the
_Elizabeth_ contradicts Palliser's charge that his ship was not
adequately supported.]

[Footnote 48: It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an
accidental explosion on board the _Formidable_.]

[Footnote 49: Chevalier. Probably later by the other times used in
this account.]

[Footnote 50: The Order of Battle was constituted by the ships "of
the line" ranging themselves one behind the other in a prescribed
succession; the position of each and the intervals between being taken
from the ship next ahead. This made the leading vessel the pivot of
the order and of manoeuvring, unless specially otherwise directed;
which in an emergency could not always be easily done. Strictly, if
circumsta