minent a place
in the scheme of Christian truth, that some clear notions respecting its
nature must be felt to be of the highest interest. It holds also, as we
have formerly seen, a most important position in the philosophy of the
moral feelings,--being that mental operation, by which we receive a
certain class of truths, of the utmost consequence to us as responsible
beings. It is a process which every one feels, but which cannot be
defined;--and it can be illustrated only by tracing its influence, in
regard to those objects to which it is more particularly directed.

The objects of faith are twofold,--truths addressed to the
understanding,--and benefits offered or promised. We have formerly had
occasion to trace the action of faith in regard to truth,--especially a
class of truths which are calculated, when really believed, to exert a
powerful effect upon our moral feelings and conduct. Its operation, we
have seen, is to bring these truths before us in such a manner, that
they exert the same kind of influence as if the facts or events were
objects of sense. The man who believes these truths, so as thus
habitually to feel then power, is he who receives them in faith. This is
the province of faith in regard to truth;--we have next to analyze its
operation in regard to offered or promised benefits,--and this we can
best do by means of an example.

Let us take the illustration of a man affected with a disease supposed
to be mortal;--he is told that a remedy has been discovered of
infallible efficacy; and that a person is at hand who is ready to
administer it. Does he perceive his danger;--does he believe the virtue
of the remedy;--does he confide in the sincerity of the individual who
offers it;--this is faith. The immediate and natural result of his faith
is, that he asks for the remedy which is offered;--and this result is
inseparable from such belief, according to the uniform sequence of
volitions in every sound mind. The man who professes to admit the facts,
and does not shew such a result of belief, professes what he does not
actually feel. If he perceives not the extent of his danger, he asks not
the remedy, because he values it not;--and the same effect may follow,
if he doubts either its efficacy, or the sincerity of him who offers it.
In this case, it is also to be observed, that a reflection is thrown
upon the character of this individual, by imputing to him an offer of
what he has either not the power or the i