mana is explained by the commentator as sankalpena.

983. The meaning is this: the man of acts is like the new-born moon,
i.e., subject to growth and decay.

984. This has been explained in a previous section.

985. The soul resides in the body without partaking of any of the
attributes of the body. It is, therefore, likened to a drop of water on a
lotus leaf, which, though on the leaf, is not yet attached to it, in so
much that it may go off without at all soaking or drenching any part of
the leaf. Yogajitatmakam is yogena jito niruddha atma chittam yena tam,
as explained by the commentator.

986. Literally, 'Tamas and Rajas and Sattwa have the attribute of Jiva
for their essence.' The particular attribute of Jiva here referred to is
the Jnanamaya kosha. Jiva, again, is all accident of the Soul. The Soul
comes from the Supreme Soul. Thus the chain of existence is traced to the
Supreme Soul. In verse 20 again it is said that the body, which by itself
is inanimate, when it exists with the Soul, is an accident of Jiva as
uninvested with attributes.

987. I follow Nilakantha substantially in his interpretation of this
verse. Two kinds of creation are here referred to as those of which Vyasa
has spoken in the previous Sections. The first is Ksharat prabhriti yah
sargah, meaning that creation which consists of the four and twenty
entities commencing with Kshara or Prakriti. The other creation,
consisting of the senses with their objects, represents buddhaiswarya or
the puissance of the buddhi, these being all buddhikalpitah. This second
creation is also atisargah which means, according to the commentator,
utkrishtah and which is also pradhanah or foremost, the reason being
bandhakatwam or its power to bind all individuals. I take atisargah to
mean 'derivative creation,' the second kind of creation being derived
from or based upon the other, or (as I have put it in the text)
transcends or overlies the other.

988. It is explained in previous sections how the course of righteousness
is regulated by the character of the particular Yuga that sets in.

989. Vyasa has already explained the character of the two apparently
hostile declarations. The meaning of Suka's question, therefore, is that
if two declarations are only apparently hostile,--if, as explained in the
Gita, they are identical,--how is that identity to be clearly
ascertained? The fact is, Suka wishes his sire to explain the topic more
clearly.

990. The cours