rgely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III.
p. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.

Sec.39. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De
Anima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the
Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of
the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general
Stoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion
arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;
cf. Diog. VII. 111. [Greek: ta pathe kriseis einai]. Instances of each in
Zeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15,
18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. [Greek: akolasia], see
Zeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the [Greek: pempte ousia] or [Greek: pempton
soma] of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a
curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that
Arist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and
highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a
material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65,
_D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he
fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33,
that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind
from [Greek: aither], which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the
fifth element ([Greek: soma aitherion] in the _De Coelo_), and of giving
this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could
correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it,
while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot
here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a
few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every
other sect, and it placed [Greek: nous en aitheri] (see Plutarch, qu. R.
and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion
that [Greek: nous] or [Greek: psyche] came from [Greek: aither] was also
fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as [Greek:
aeikinetos] in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great
hold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in
_Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._