more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little
or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
entitled _Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard
to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He
denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles
of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's
ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have
afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important
for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the
new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as
genuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this
book. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the
sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single
sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these
sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_
knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on
the truth of the individual perception of sense.

Sec.Sec.19--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give
perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain
the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which
impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we
always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated
senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!
(20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions
of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since
they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at
definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic
memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).
That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would
act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?
(23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence
must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action
is impossible (25). The doctrines of