parts to the composition of one entire body
of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of
blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?" "I desire," quoth I,
"that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the
particulars." "Do we not think," quoth she, "that blessedness is good?"
"Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. "Thou mayest," quoth she, "add this
to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the
chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these--
sufficiency, power, and the rest--the good, in the sense that they are
members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?" "I
understand," quoth I, "what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what
thou concludest." "This is the decision of this matter. If all these
were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For
this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body.
But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore
they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one
member, which cannot be." "There is no doubt of this," quoth I, "but I
expect that which is behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be
referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed
good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good.
And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore
goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is
neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means
be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of
their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were
truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought
after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a
thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one
would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of
riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired
in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness
itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are
desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by
which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and
the self-same substance." "I s