es etiam malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse
manifestum est. Huc accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam
omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen
ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possibilitas referri ad bonum non potest;
expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur
malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem
potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas ueramque illam
Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse
sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent
explere non posse. Faciunt enim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id
bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam
ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.

II.[144]

"Oh!" quoth I. "How great things dost thou promise! And I doubt not but
thou canst perform them, wherefore stay me not now that thou hast
stirred up my desires." "First then," quoth she, "that good men are
always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know,
the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are
contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of
evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty
of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness. But that
our opinions may be more certainly embraced, I will take both ways,
confirming my propositions, sometime from one part, sometime from
another.

There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and
power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.
For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will,
and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou seest
any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst not
doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would." "It is
manifest," quoth I, "and can by no means be denied." "And wilt thou
doubt that he could, whom thou seest bring to pass what he desired?"
"No." "But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that
which he cannot do." "I confess it," quoth I. "Dost thou remember then,"
quoth she, "that it was inferred by our former discourses that all the
intentions of man's will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses
be divers?" "I