Recourse already has been had to the
expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of
filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less
efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves.

Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the
plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians
and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with
them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and
trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited
conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria.
The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and
conscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops are
in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops
stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers
against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are
heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the
Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the
climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops.
The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the
march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value.
There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with
every prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative
proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native
Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before
Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the
native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War,
Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians.
An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age
available for military service. The Commission appointed for the purpose
reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in
the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined
some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time. They
could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen
the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in
the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the
formation of reserves.

As regards the black tr