ch is," calling it ENS because it is eternal and
incorruptible, and one because it is always like itself and admits no
diversity. And as for that part which is sensible, he places it in the
rank of uncertain, disorderly, and always moving. Of which two parts, we
may see the distinct judgment:--

One certain truth and sincere knowledge is,

as regarding that which is intelligible, and always alike and of the
same sort;

The other does on men's opinions rest,
Which breed no true belief within our breast,

because it is conversant in things which receive all sorts of changes,
passions, and inequalities. Now how he could have left sense and
opinion, if he had not also left any sensible and opinable object, it
is impossible for any man to say. But because to that which truly IS
it appertains to continue in its being, and because sensible things
sometimes are, sometimes are not, continually passing from one being to
another and perpetually changing their state, he thought they required
some other name than that of ENTIA, or things which always are. This
speech therefore concerning ENS (or that which is), that it should be
but one, is not to take away the plurality of sensible things, but to
show how they differ from that which is intelligible. Which difference
Plato in his discussion of Ideas more fully declaring, has thereby
afforded Colotes an opportunity of cavilling.

Therefore it seems not unfitting to me to take next into our
consideration, as it were all in a train, what he has also said against
him. But first let us contemplate a little the diligence--together with
the manifold and profound knowledge--of this our philosopher, who says,
that Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and all the Peripateties
have followed these doctrines of Plato. For in what corner of the
uninhabitable world have you, O Colotes, written your book, that,
composing all these accusations against such personages, you never have
lighted upon their works, nor have taken into your hands the books of
Aristotle concerning Heaven and the Soul, nor those of Theophrastus
against the Naturalists, nor the Zoroaster of Heraclides, nor his books
of Hell, nor that of Natural Doubts and Difficulties, nor the book of
Dicaearchus concerning the Soul; in all which books they are in the
highest degree contradictory and repugnant to Plato about the principal
and greatest points of natural philosophy? Nay, Strato himself, the very
head and pri