and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the
wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in
co-operation with Powers hostile to her." Although M. Streit had laid
down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the
result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions
between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast
developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the
Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M.
Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony
between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his
resignation.[18]

M. Venizelos did not resign after all. But his letter marks an epoch
none the less. At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the
Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the
same. The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to
throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without
any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more
circumspect. M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as
prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this
view to Entente quarters. It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation,
since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent.
But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King
Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through
Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his
Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to
supply the British Government, through the same channel, with
information from his secret service.[19]

[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention. As this article originally
stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case
of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria." It
was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without
objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war
between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under
the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance."
But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty
relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other
interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite